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 Learning is faster in a bust when only the winning bids are disclosed 
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Abstract
We consider a model in which agents gradually learn about the aggregate market conditions— ‘boom’ or ‘bust’— from the
information disclosed after a trading round. The disclosure rules can generate asymmetric learning and affect the degree of
asymmetry. In particular, when only winning bids are publicly disclosed, learning is more rapid in a bust.
JEL classiﬁcation: D82, D83.
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1. Introduction
In many markets there is limited disclosure of price of-
fers and it is common to only observe the final transaction
prices; for example, a real-estate buyer may collect informa-
tion on past prices but he may not have any information on
unsuccessful offers. The existence of informational limita-
tions may come from different origins: the absence of an or-
ganized trading platform, practical limitations on information
disclosure, legal restrictions on transparency, etc.
This paper considers a model where agents gradually learn
about the aggregate market conditions— ‘boom’ or ‘bust’—
from the information publicly disclosed after a trading round.
We show how the type of information disclosed may not be
equally informativewhen the aggregatemarket is in a ‘boom’
or in a ‘bust’. Our main result provides a relationship be-
tween the statistical properties of the disclosed information
and the different speeds of learning in booms and busts. In
particular, when only the winning offers are disclosed—a
common feature in many markets—beliefs tend to adjust
more rapidly when the aggregate state is low, i.e., in a ‘bust’.
Indeed, the winning offer discloses the highest private valu-
ation among the bidders, and a low realization of it provides
strong evidence in favor of the low state because it implies
that all bidders have low private valuations. On the con-
trary, a high realization may merely come from a single out-
lier with a particularly high valuation, hence bringing weaker
evidence in favor of the high state. In other words, compe-
tition among buyers introduces orderedness in the formation
of trading prices, and in turn generates asymmetric informa-
tiveness about the underlying states.
This learning pattern is likely to affect the resulting price
dynamics in relevant markets, especially their responsiveness
to cyclical changes. For instance, in Palazzo and Zhang [10]
we present an auction model with resale in which bids en-
dogenously depend on bidders’ beliefs over the aggregate
market conditions. Asymmetric learning implies a more rapid
decline of prices during a bust relative to the corresponding
rise during a boom.
Our model shares the feature of learning about underlying
states from public observables with the literature on observa-
tional learning. The literature mainly studies whether public
beliefs converge to the truth, i.e., complete learning, which
is not an issue here with trading prices as observables.3 We
instead focus on the relative speed of learning between the
underlying states, and how it depends on the type of informa-
tion disclosed by the public observables.4 In this respect, our
work is also related to the literature on procyclical learning
as a source of business cycles. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veld-
kamp [13], Chalkley and Lee [4] and Veldkamp [14] share the
idea that agents enjoy more precise signals during a boom: in
the former paper learning is faster in a boom because of an
increase in the signal precision; in the latter two papers the
precision of public signals changes along the cycle due to dif-
ferences in the endogenous composition of informed agents.
In these models the dynamics of beliefs and aggregate activ-
ities are characterized by fast declines and slow recoveries.
3As Lee [6] shows, learning is complete with sufficiently ‘rich’ action
spaces, (e.g., prices), and nondegenerate payoffs. See also earlier work by
Milgrom [7] on information aggregation in auctions.
4A related work by Acemoglu et al. [1] studies the rate of convergence
of learning when agents observe either the most recent action or a random
action from the past.
Relative to this strand of literature, the asymmetric speed of
learning in this paper arises from the orderedness of the in-
formation disclosed to the public. On the other hand, infor-
mation disclosure in our model is determined exogenously by
the trading mechanism, as opposed to the literature on infor-
mation revelation in auctions where disclosure is endogenous
and strategic.5 Similarly, our work also differs from the liter-
ature on learning in decentralized markets where information
revelation again is through strategic trading behavior of sell-
ers and/or buyers.6
Section 2 provides the main result on asymmetric learn-
ing. Section 3 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. Setup
Consider a sequential market for a durable object. Time
is discrete, t ∈ {0,1,2, . . .}, and there is an unobservable state
θ ∈ {H,L}. pi0 ≡ P0(θ =H) = 12 denotes the common prior,
and pit ≡ Pt(θ =H) denotes the public posterior at the begin-
ning of period t.
In every period t an identical object is offered on sale and
N ≥ 2 buyers are randomly drawn from a population of in-
finitely many agents. The object is sold according to a trading
mechanismMt and each buyer reports a message mit to the
mechanism based on her private valuation vit of the object.
The private valuations generated in each period are identi-
cally and independently distributed according to a cumula-
tive distribution function (cdf) Fθ across the N buyers and
over time. Both FH and FL are absolutely continuous on the
common support [0,1], and continuously differentiable with
probability density functions (pdf) fH and fL that satisfy strict
monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property.
By the revelation principle (Myerson [9]), there exists a
direct mechanism to which all buyers in period t truthfully re-
port their valuations, Vt ≡ (v1t ,v2t , ...,vNt ). We abstract from
modeling any specific informational limitations, and directly
characterize the information publicly revealed by the (direct)
trading mechanism with a reduced-form disclosure rule (a
measurable statistic), T : [0,1]N →RM,M ≤N. For instance,
if trades take place through a sequence of first-price auctions,
public disclosure of the winning bid is equivalent to public
disclosure of the highest valuation in Vt .
2.2. Asymmetric Learning
Denotewith ST the support of disclosed informationT (V ),
and f Tθ the pdf of T (V ) under state θ .
7 We describe the evo-
lution of the public beliefs in terms of log-likelihood ratio,
5The focus there is often on the revelation of seller’s information for the
purpose of revenue maximization. The seminal paper by Milgrom and Weber
[8] shows that full revelation is optimal, known as the ‘linkage principle’.
More recent papers by Benoît and Dubra [2] and Tan [12] consider buyers’
information revelation in auctions with both private and common values.
6This literature studies whether trading process implies full information
revelation when the decentralized market becomes approximately friction-
less. Wolinsky [16] and Blouin and Serrano [3] propose negative answers in
either stationary or non-stationary settings, while Serrano and Yosha [11]
confirm the existence of fully revealing equilibria under one-sided informa-
tional asymmetry in the stationary setting. In a setting with finitely many
sellers and a continuum of buyers, Gottardi and Serrano [5] show that infor-
mation is fully and immediately revealed under intense competition among
sufficiently many sellers.
7With a slight abuse of notation, time subscript for V is omitted due to
its i.i.d. property over time.
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updated with a new disclosure yt ∈ ST in period t:
lt+1(lt ,yt) = ln
pit+1
1−pit+1 = ln
pit
1−pit
f TH (yt)
f TL (yt)
= lt + ln
f TH (yt)
f TL (yt)
. (1)
We add a superscript T to the log-likelihood ratios in equa-
tion (1) to stress their dependence on the disclosure rule T ,
and simply denote the belief update from period t to t+ 1 by
∆lTt+1(yt) ≡ lTt+1− lTt = ln f
T
H (yt)
f TL (yt)
. The information generated
by T is assumed bounded but non-trivial:
∃M > 0 s.t. 0< |∆lT (y)|<M for almost every y ∈ ST . (2)
For any integer q≥ 1, equation (1) generalizes into:
lTt+q = l
T
t +
q
∑
m=1
∆lTt+m(yt+m−1). (3)
Taking the expected value:
Et,θ [lTt+q] = lTt +
q
∑
m=1
Et,θ
[
∆lTt+m(yt+m−1)
]
= lTt +qEθ
[
∆lT
]
.
(4)
The last equation exploits the fact that, conditional on θ , sam-
ples are i.i.d. across all periods.
Proposition 1 links the information revealed by the trad-
ing mechanism to the relative speed of convergence of public
beliefs to the high or low state.
Proposition 1. Let:
τεH ≡ inf{t ≥ 0 : pit ≥ 1− ε} , τεL ≡ inf{t ≥ 0 : pit ≤ ε} .8 (5)
For a measurable statistic T : [0,1]N →RM , we have
lim
ε→0
EH [τεH ]
EL[τεL ]
≥
∣∣∣∣ EL[∆lT ]EH [∆lT ]
∣∣∣∣> 1 if EH [∆lT ]+EL[∆lT ]< 0; (6)
lim
ε→0
EL[τεL ]
EH [τεH ]
≥
∣∣∣∣EH [∆lT ]EL[∆lT ]
∣∣∣∣> 1 if EH [∆lT ]+EL[∆lT ]> 0. (7)
The ratio
∣∣∣EH [∆lT ]EL[∆lT ] ∣∣∣ determines, in every period, whether
the information revealed by T is more or less informative be-
tween the two states. Proposition 1 highlights that, in our
dynamic setup with gradual information revelation, this ra-
tio also serves as a lower bound for the ratio of the expected
times to (almost) learn the truth under the two states.
The next corollary points out that the speed of learning
is asymmetric when the trading mechanism reveals an order
statistic. In the remainder we denote with v(k,N) the k-th high-
est value among the N values in V .
Corollary 1. For T (V )= v(1,N) with sufficiently large N, equa-
tion (6) holds, i.e., learning is faster under state L.
The number of buyers N has two effects on learning. On
the one hand, with a larger N, a low realization of v(1,N) be-
comes stronger evidence in favor of state L as it suggests all
buyers must have low private valuations, while a high realiza-
tion of v(1,N) becomes weaker evidence in favor of state H as
it could just come from a single buyer with an ‘abnormally’
8τ εH denotes the time to get within ε distance to the truth, and thus
approximates the time for learning when ε is arbitrarily small.
high valuation. Such informational asymmetry toward state
L is amplified as N increases. On the other hand, increasing
the number of buyers N makes v(1,N) more likely to have rel-
atively high rather than low realizations, i.e. people are more
likely to observe evidence in favor of state H. Nevertheless,
such distributional advantage toward state H diminishes as N
gets large, because any further increase of N does not shift
much the distribution of the order statistic. Therefore, the
first effect dominates the second one for sufficiently large N,
and it eventually leads to different speeds of learning under
the two states.9
3. Conclusion
This paper provides a formal condition to characterize
how partial information disclosure of trading histories can
generate a difference in the speed of learning about the ag-
gregate market conditions. In particular, when only winning
offers are publicly disclosed, learning is relatively faster and
prices thus respond more quickly during a bust than during
a boom. A natural way to limit such difference in price re-
sponsiveness along the cycle is to grant full disclosure of past
price offers.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
As pi0 = 12 , for every t ≥ 1 we have lTt = ∑t−1i=0 ∆lTi+1, where
∆lTi+1 = ln
f TH (yi)
f TL (yi)
, i = 0,1, ..., t, are i.i.d. across periods. The
learning times τεH and τεL can be expressed in terms of lTt :
τεH = inf
{
t > 0 : lTt ≥ ln
1− ε
ε
}
, τεL = inf
{
t > 0 : lTt ≤ ln
ε
1− ε
}
(8)
ApplyingWald [15]’s lemma to the i.i.d. sequence {∆lTi+1}ti=0:
Eθ [lTτ εθ ] = Eθ [τ
ε
θ ]Eθ [∆l
T ] ∀θ ∈ {H,L} (9)
By Gibbs’ inequality,
EH [∆lT ]≡
∫
ST
ln
f TH (y)
f TL (y)
f TH (y)d(y)> 0, (10)
and similarly EL[∆lT ]< 0.10 When EH [∆lT ]+EL[∆lT ]< 0,
EL[∆lT ] =−
(
EH [∆lT ]+c
)
(11)
where c = −∫ST ln f TH (y)f TL (y) ( f TH (y)+ f TL (y))d(y) > 0. Notice
that c only depends on the pdfs and is independent of ε . Sub-
stituting in (9):
EH [τεH ]EH [∆lT ] = EH [lTτ εH ]
EL[τεL ](EH [∆l
T ]+c) = −EL[lTτ εL ]
(12)
Hence:
EH [∆lT ](EH [τεH ]−EL[τεL ]) = EH [lTτ εH ]+EL[l
T
τ εL
]+EL[τεL ]c (13)
9With the same intuition, Corollary 1 can be naturally extended to the
case of T(V ) = v(k,N) with a general k.
10The inequalities are strict as |∆lT |= | ln f
T
H
f TL
|> 0 a.s. by assumption.
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Rearranging:
EH [∆lT ]
(
EH [τεH ]
EL[τεL ]
−1
)
=
EH [lTτ εH ]+EL[l
T
τ εL
]
EL[τεL ]
+c (14)
Notice that |∆lT | < M implies EL[lTτεL ] ≥ ln
ε
1−ε −M and by
definition EH [lTτεH ]≥ ln
1−ε
ε , so:
EH [∆lT ](
EH [τεH ]
EL[τεL ]
−1)≥ −M
EL[τεL ]
+c (15)
On the other hand, by equation (9):
EL[τεL ] =
EL[lTτ εL ]
EL[∆lT ]
≥ ln
1−ε
ε
M
> 0 (16)
⇒ EH [∆lT ](EH [τ
ε
H ]
EL[τεL ]
−1) ≥− M
2
ln 1−εε
+c (17)
Since 0< EH [∆lT ]<M, we have:
EH [τεH ]
EL[τεL ]
− 1> − M
ln 1−εε
+ cEH [∆lT ]
= − M
ln 1−εε
+ −EH [∆l
T ]−EL[∆lT ]
EH [∆lT ]
= − M
ln 1−εε
− 1+
∣∣∣ EL[∆lT ]EH [∆lT ] ∣∣∣ as EL[∆lT ]< 0
(18)
Since ln 1−εε → ∞ as ε → 0, hence ∀δ > 0, ∃ε > 0 such
that ∀ε < ε , M
ln 1−εε
< δ . The proof for the case of EH [∆lT ]+
EL[∆lT ]> 0 is symmetric.
Proof of Corollary 1
By Proposition 1, we show that EH [∆lT ] +EL[∆lT ] < 0 for
sufficiently large N.
The pdf of v(1,N) is f (1,N)θ (y) = NF
N−1
θ (y) fθ (y) so:
∆lT (y) = ln
f (1,N)H (y)
f (1,N)L (y)
= (N−1) ln FH(y)
FL(y)
+ ln
fH(y)
fL(y)
(19)
Consider the new order statistic T ′(V ) = v(1,N+1). Similarly,
∆lT
′
(y) = ln
f (1,N+1)H (y)
f (1,N+1)L (y)
= N ln
FH(y)
FL(y)
+ ln
fH(y)
fL(y)
(20)
It suffices to show that:
EH [∆lT
′
]+EL[∆lT
′
]< EH [∆lT ]+EL[∆lT ] (21)
for all N sufficiently large. Decomposing the difference be-
tween the two as follows:
EH [∆lT
′
]+EL[∆lT
′
]− (EH [∆lT ]+EL[∆lT ])
=
∫ 1
0 ∆lT
′
(y)dF (1,N+1)H (y)+
∫ 1
0 ∆lT
′
(y)dF (1,N+1)L (y)
−∫ 10 ∆lT (y)dF (1,N)H (y)− ∫ 10 ∆lT (y)dF(1,N)L (y)
=
∫ 1
0 [∆lT
′
(y)−∆lT (y)]dF (1,N+1)H (y)+
∫ 1
0 [∆lT
′
(y)−∆lT (y)]dF (1,N+1)L (y)
+
∫ 1
0 ∆lT (y)d[F
(1,N+1)
H (y)−F(1,N)H (y)]+
∫ 1
0 ∆lT (y)d[F
(1,N+1)
L (y)−F(1,N)L (y)]
=
∫ 1
0
ln
FH(y)
FL(y)
dF (1,N+1)H (y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1H )
+
∫ 1
0
ln
FH(y)
FL(y)
dF (1,N+1)L (y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1L)
+
∫ 1
0
∆lT (y)d[F (1,N+1)H (y)−F(1,N)H (y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2H )
+
∫ 1
0
∆lT (y)d[F (1,N+1)L (y)−F(1,N)L (y)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2L)
By the mean value theorem for integrals:
(1H )+(1L)= ln
FH(ŷ)
FL(ŷ)
+ln
FH(y˜)
FL(y˜)
< 0 for some ŷ, y˜∈ (0,1), (22)
where FH(·)< FL(·) due to the MLR property.
Meanwhile, ∆lT is bounded a.s. by assumption and
F(1,N+1)θ (·)−F
(1,N)
θ (·)→ 0 as N → ∞, for θ ∈ {H,L}. (23)
Hence, (2H),(2L) → 0 as N → ∞.11 Then for sufficiently
large N, the expression EH [∆lT
′
] + EL[∆lT
′
]− (EH [∆lT ] +
EL[∆lT ]) has the same sign of (1H)+ (1L), i.e., negative.
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